The Ninth Circuit held that the right to counsel provided by 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) does not apply to "applicants for admission" at primary or secondary inspection and held that a lawful permanent resident may be treated as an applicant for admission based on the inspecting officer's conclusions.
Generally, returning lawful permanent residents are not considered to be applicants for admission unless an exception at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) applies. Here, the exception was that the LPR was found to have engaged in illegal activity after departure from the U.S.: he allegedly attempted to smuggle his niece into the country upon return. The officers detained him 28 hours and interrogated him, obtaining a sworn statement admitting to the smuggling. At his removal hearing he sought to suppress the statement. He argued he had a right to counsel because he could not be considered an arriving alien until he received a final administrative determination of that issue by the immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the respondent's argument was "not consistent with the language of the statute or with logic." Really? The officer usually has nothing more than suspicion until the officer interrogates the returning resident--here after more than 24 hours in detention with no access to counsel. Thus, it is the denial of counsel that permits the government to establish that a returning resident is an arriving alien--not vice versa.
As an interesting corollary, I think most CBP officers would be surprised to learn that returning residents have a right to counsel during primary and secondary inspection IF they cannot be considered arriving aliens under § 1101(a)(13)(C). In other words, I don't think an LPR who is potentially deportable for a conviction but not inadmissible for it (e.g., a firearms offense) will be given an opportunity to have his attorney present at the airport. We'll see if that changes with this decision.