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Category: Deportability / Inadmissibility Grounds

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The Board held that the Nevada offense of attempted violation of NRS 205.273 (possession of a stolen vehicle) was not a categorical aggravated felony theft offense under the law of the Ninth Circuit. NRS 205.273 may be satisfied by possessing, receiving, or transferring a stolen vehicle with either knowledge that it was stolen or reason to believe that it was stolen. However, the generic definition of an aggravated felony theft offense, according to the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in U.S. v. Corona-Sanchez, requires "the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.” The Board appropriately recognized that a conviction does not require that intent if it is based on what a reasonable person should have known, rather than what the defendant actually knew. Therefore, a conviction under NRS 205.273 does not categorically meet the theft definition.

The Board declined to decide whether NRS 205.273 is divisible into two separately enumerated crimes, possession with knowledge and possession with reason to believe. Since both alternatives are listed in the statute, it would seem to be divisible and thus susceptible to the modified categorical approach. I do not know much about Nevada law, though, so perhaps there is an argument against divisibility. It did not matter in this case because the record did not indicate whether the conviction was for knowledge or reason to believe.

The Board also explicitly reserved the question of whether receipt of stolen property with reason to believe it was stolen would meet the generic definition of a theft offense absent controlling circuit precedent. It noted that many jurisdictions, although not most, included receipt with reason to believe in theft statutes at the time Congress enacted the theft aggravated felony definition.

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The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its erroneous precedent on the maximum potential sentence to imprisonment for California misdemeanors and its precedent that California Penal Code (CPC) section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon) is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. It also found unpersuasive a Board decision from 1947 that held a CPC 245 conviction involved moral turpitude, since that decision did not apply the categorical analysis. The court remanded to the Board to determine in the first instance whether CPC 245 is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). It further urged the Board to issue a publish decision promptly.

I, for one, am not optimistic the Board will quickly provide a published decision. A prompt answer certainly is important, since CPC 245 is a very common conviction and immigrants should be able to know whether it is a CIMT before deciding to give up their constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea to it. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, though, the question is a difficult one. On one hand, the element of a deadly weapon (a firearm in subsection (a)(2)) makes the offense more serious. However, assault does not require actual injury or even physical contact. Further, the court noted assault is a general intent crime that does not require an intent to injure or a conscious disregard of an unreasonable risk of injury (or, more precisely, it does not require an intent to create an apprehension of a completed battery or a conscious disregard of an unreasonable risk of creating an apprehension of a completed battery). So, I think the Board will struggle with this, which would be unfortunate.

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The Supreme Court held a conviction for simple battery against a domestic victim triggers the prohibition against firearms possession at 8 USC 922(g)(9), a federal crime. Immigration advocates had feared that a holding along these lines would be used to justify expanding the domestic violence ground of deportability to also include simple battery against a domestic victim--making deportable, for example, an immigrant convicted of the misdemeanor offense of pushing his wife.

Fortunately, however, the Court explicitly stated at footnote 4 that nothing in its decision should cast doubt on precedent that holds simple battery against a domestic victim does not implicate the deportability ground. The court recognized that the deportability ground incorporates the generally-applicable "crime of violence" definition at 18 USC 16, which the Court has repeatedly held applies only to the active use of violent force capable of causing injury.

The criminal statute in Castleman did not include that reference to 18 USC 16, so the Court applied a much more expansive definition of domestic violence, over Justice Scalia's objections. It cited arguments and statistics by advocacy groups and the Department of Justice to explain why a simple battery that would not be considered "violent" in the ordinary sense is "violent" when it occurs in the domestic context, since it often occurs as part of a pattern of intimidation and control.

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The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion finding that the controlled substance schedules referenced by California Health and Safety Code (CHSC) 11377 (as well as 11378 and 11379) are not a categorical match for the federal controlled substance schedules. Specifically, it found khat (Catha Edulis) appears on the California schedules, but that the federal courts have held it is not covered by the federal schedules. Likewise, chorionic gonadotropin (HGC) is listed on the California schedules, but is not listed on the federal ones. That means a conviction under CHSC 11377(a) does not categorically make a noncitizen inadmissible or deportable for a conviction relating to a federal controlled substance.

The respondent had further argued CHSC 11377(a) was not divisible pursuant to Descamps v. United States and thus could never trigger inadmissibility or deportability, regardless of the record of conviction. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit rejected that argument and held it could conduct a modified categorical analysis to see if the record of conviction establishes the conviction was for a federal controlled substance. The charge in this case alleged only one controlled substance, methamphetamine (obviously a federal controlled substance), and the clerk's docket reflected conviction on the charge, so the court held the government established inadmissibility under the modified categorical approach. It found a clerk's docket for a misdemeanor case was just as reliable as a minute order, which the court previously had held could be used under the modified categorical approach. Of course, clerk's dockets and minute orders often do contain errors, but presumably it found them reliable because a defendant may inspect and correct them if they are not accurate. I say presumably because the court did not explicitly say so here.

The court did remand the case to the Board, however, because it failed to address his pro se claims on appeal that his previous attorney was ineffective and that the immigration judge did not act as a neutral fact-finder, which might have impacted his application for cancellation of removal.

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The Board held that an adjustment of status by a respondent who entered the U.S. without inspection was an "admission" and the respondent therefore was deportable for conviction of an aggravated felony "after admission." It disagreed with and distinguished the precedent on 212(h) eligibility, where circuit courts have held an aggravated felony does not disqualify a permanent resident unless he or she was admitted to the U.S. as a permanent resident (not where he or she adjusted to permanent resident status). The Board found it would be absurd to interpret the statute to entirely exempt immigrants who adjusted status from the grounds of deportability, which only apply to persons in and admitted to the U.S.

The Board further found that a sentence enhancement specified in the Manual for Courts-Martial that must be pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt is an "element" that may be examined under the categorical analysis for immigration purposes.

In this case, the Board held a sodomy sentence enhancement for sodomy committed "by force and without the consent of the other person" categorically satisfies the crime of violence aggravated felony definition (if the sentence is to one year or more). It found the conviction satisfied both subsection (a) and subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. 16. It found it satisfied subsection (a) because it held the conviction had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. It also found the offense satisfied subsection (b) because sodomy by force, which requires physical force and lack of the victim’s consent for a conviction, by its nature involves a substantial risk that the perpetrator will resort to intentional physical force in the course of committing the crime.

Interestingly, in a portion of the decision not digested by the Board at the beginning of the case, the Board rejected without much analysis the respondent's argument that he did not receive a sentence to one year or more for any single one of his three sodomy convictions. Apparently, he received a sentence to 18 months on the three counts and it was not clear whether this was a single concurrent sentence (i.e., 18 months on each conviction with the period of imprisonment to run at the same time) or three consecutive sentences (say, three sentences to 6 months each). The Board characterized the sentence as a "general sentence" and cited a 66 year-old Board opinion to find it satisfied the crime of violence aggravated felony definition's requirement of a sentence to one year or more. Due to the paucity of the Board's analysis, though, it is hard to know whether the respondent's argument had any merit. This is unfortunate in a published decision.

Finally, the Board rejected respondent's claim to eligibility for a "stand alone" 212(h) waiver. It held 212(h) is not available unless the applicant is an arriving alien seeking to waive a charge of inadmissibility or an applicant to adjust (or readjust) status to permanent residence. See Matter of Rivas, 26 I&N Dec. 130,
132, 134 (BIA 2013).

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The Ninth Circuit held that felony false imprisonment in violation of California Penal Code section 236/237 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. This conclusion was virtually a foregone conclusion given the Ninth Circuit previously had found the more serious offense of simple kidnapping in violation of California Penal Code section 207(a) did not categorically involve moral turpitude.

The court noted the California appellate courts had upheld felony false imprisonment convictions under a "menace" theory in circumstances that did not fit the federal definition of moral turpitude. See People v. Islas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 875–82 (Ct. App. 2012) (two gang members convicted of false imprisonment by menace after hiding from police for about 15 minutes in an apartment rented by a mother and her children; conviction upheld even though the defendants did not brandish a weapon, did not act in a hostile manner, did not touch the woman or her family, did not issue any verbal threats, and, in fact, expressly told her that “they were not going to harm her or her children”).

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Reviewing Attorney General's decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino, the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit and three other circuits to reject the new procedure announced in that case whereby an immigration adjudicator can go beyond the record of conviction to evaluate whether a noncitizen is inadmissible for a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Fifth Circuit found the statutory text of INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i) was unambiguous and thus foreclosed the Attorney General's interpretation. The text makes inadmissible an alien "convicted of" or who admits to a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Here, Silva-Trevino had not admitted to a CIMT. Thus, the question was whether evidence outside the record of conviction could be used to establish that he was convicted of such a crime. The court said no, tracking the analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Olivas-Motta v. Holder-.

The only questionable part of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Silva-Trevino and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Olivas-Motta is the reference to INA 240(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(3)(B). That section lists the documents can be used to prove the existence of a conviction, and both Silva-Trevino and Olivas-Motta cite it to suggest that documents not listed there cannot be used to prove a conviction involved moral turpitude. The reverse implication is that all of the documents in that list can be used to prove the offense involved turpitude. The list contains court records, jail records, state criminal histories, etc. The use of those documents to establish the existence of a conviction is not controversial--that is what the statute permits (and that is all that it permits). The unlimited use of those documents to prove the nature of the conviction, however, would create a problem. Some of those documents contain extraneous information that the defendant did not admit and the judge or jury did not find. And the Supreme Court twice last term emphasized that the categorical analysis concerns only those elements that a defendant necessarily was convicted of. The unconsidered citation to 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(3)(B) suggests otherwise.

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The Ninth Circuit held that a guilty plea to possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute may be considered in determining whether there is reason to believe the noncitizen is a drug trafficker--even if the conviction is later overturned, at least if the conviction is overturned for a reason unrelated to the voluntariness of the plea.

Here, the noncitizen's conviction was overturned because the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop that led to his arrest. Nonetheless, the court held the plea--along with circumstantial evidence in the case--could be considered to establish the noncitizen's inadmissibility for reason to believe he had engaged in drug trafficking.

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Following the Supreme Court's decision in Descamps, the Ninth Circuit adhered to its original decision in this case (despite the frolic occasioned by Aguila-Montes de Oca). It held that a court may only examine the elements of a conviction to determine whether the conviction satisfies the requirements of a federal definition. Further, a reviewing court may look to the contents of a record of conviction only when necessary to identify which of multiple alternative elements the defendant was convicted of (and then only if at least one alternative would satisfy the federal definition).

Here, the court found the immigrant's conviction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for using a government computer to access pornography did not include as an element the depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct (because the order he violated prohibited accessing any type of pornography), so the conviction did not satisfy the aggravated felony definition of conviction of a child pornography offense. Nor could the government resort to the record of conviction because the statute of conviction was not divisible into multiple alternative elements--the element of the depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct was entirely missing from the offense.

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The Board held that a conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was categorically an aggravated felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act makes a conviction under “section 922(g)(1)... of title 18, United States Code (relating to firearms offenses)” an aggravated felony. The respondent had argued the parenthetical "relating to firearms offenses" limited the definition to firearms and thus excluded ammunition offenses. The Board rejected that argument. It noted that parentheticals have often been found to be merely descriptive and that the language of this particular parenthetical does not indicate Congress intended it to have a limiting effect.

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